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ABSTRACT 
Users disclose ever-increasing amounts of personal data on Social 
Network Service platforms (SNS). Unless SNSs’ policies are 
privacy friendly, this leaves them vulnerable to privacy risks 
because they ignore the privacy policies. Designers and regulators 
have pushed for shorter, simpler and more prominent privacy 
policies, however the evidence that transparent policies increase 
informed consent is lacking. To answer this question, we 
conducted an online experiment with 214 regular Facebook users 
asked to join a fictitious SNS. We experimentally manipulated the 
privacy-friendliness of SNS’s policy and varied threats of 
secondary data use and data visibility. Half of our participants 
incorrectly recalled even the most formally “perfect” and easy-to-
read privacy policies. Mostly, users recalled policies as more 
privacy friendly than they were. Moreover, participants self-
censored their disclosures when aware that visibility threats were 
present, but were less sensitive to threats of secondary data use. 
We present design recommendations to increase informed 
consent. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Security and privacy~Privacy protections • Security and 
privacy~Usability in security and privacy • Social and 
professional topics~Privacy policies 
KEYWORDS 
Privacy, privacy policies, personal data disclosure, transparency, 
social networks 
INTRODUCTION 
Self-disclosure is the main purpose of participation in social 
networking service (SNS) platforms, and thus, it is in this context 
that transparency of privacy policies is particularly relevant [1]. 
SNS users disclose enormous amounts of personal data (PD). For 
example, as of August 2018, over two billion active Facebook 
users, 800 million Instagram users, and 330 million Twitter users 
upload over 450 million photos and 550 million status updates and 
tweets per day [2-5]. In line with their privacy policies, the SNSs 
use these data as an economic asset and share it with third parties 
whereas at the same time their default settings make the users’ 
self-disclosures publically available [6-9]. This often puts users’ 
privacy at risk [1, 10, 11], as is evident from the abundance of 
recent privacy scandals.  
The bottleneck preventing privacy infringements are the SNSs 
privacy policies. Ideally, privacy policies should make users aware 
of the risks entailed and instigate privacy-protective behaviors 
such as avoiding data-invasive SNSs or reducing disclosures in 
response to the SNSs privacy-friendliness. Despite the general 
availability of privacy policies, prior research suggests that users 
hold little awareness of what data are collected and what threats 
this may entail [12, 13]. A presumed key reason is that policies are 
difficult to comprehend and inadequate as an information tool 
[14-17]. As a consequence, users provide consent without being 
actually informed about what they are consenting to. 
In response, scholars and policy makers have called for easily 
comprehensible, transparent privacy policies [15, 18-23]. The 
general assumption is that prominent and simple policies will lead 
to truly informed consent and consequently a more privacy 
friendly market because informed users will reward privacy-
friendly SNSs and punish privacy-invasive SNSs. 
Yet, can we be sure that transparent privacy policies will affect PD 
disclosure behavior as a function of their privacy friendliness? So 
far we do not have a clear answer to this question. No study to 
date has investigated how transparency of privacy policy would 
influence actual disclosure on SNSs depending on whether or not 
they are privacy-friendly. Even if it is transparent, users may 
refuse to attend to the policy, miscomprehend or ignore it [14, 24-
26].  
Here, we design a comprehensive experiment to empirically 
address three fundamental questions: 1) Will transparent privacy 
policies on SNSs lead to actual policy comprehension? 2) Will 
transparent privacy policies prompt users to alter their disclosure 
behavior in response to how privacy-friendly the policy actually 
is? And 3) provided there is miscomprehension, will 
comprehension affect disclosure behavior in response to a policy’s 
privacy friendliness? Though prior studies attest to a lack of 
comprehension [12, 18, 27], none of them established whether or 
not this would directly affect self-disclosure. 
In addition to addressing these overarching questions, we 
contribute to the literature by taking a nuanced look at the type 
of disclosure (quantity and quality) and the type of privacy threat 
present. Specifically, we focus on two threats that are known to 
be relevant to users and should thus affect them if made 
transparent [28-30]. These are PD visibility, i.e. whether others 
can see the data, and secondary use of PD, i.e. whether SNSs 
require the right to use the disclosed data beyond what is needed 
to serve the user. In our experiment, we vary the presence of both 
threats when manipulating the privacy friendliness of transparent 
SNSs policies. This adds to earlier insights from research in e-
commerce settings [18, 26, 31-36] and makes this one of the first 
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studies to investigate how different types of transparent privacy 
threats affect disclosure behavior on SNSs.  
Eventually the insights pursued here help consolidate two 
opposing views: one that sees the users as rational agents who, if 
properly informed, can protect their privacy by altering their 
disclosure behavior [15, 37] and another that sees users as 
bounded in their rationality and ultimately manipulable by 
companies who have high interest in collecting their data [13, 38]. 
RELATED WORK  
e Role of Transparent Privacy Policies in 
Securing Information Privacy 
Information privacy is one of the biggest ethical concerns 
accompanying Internet use today [1, 39, 40] and user data 
disclosure plays a pivotal role in bringing about these concerns. 
An abundance of theories has been established to describe and 
explain self-disclosure online [for reviews see 31, 37, 41, 42]. Based 
on their underlying assumptions, Barth and de Jong [42] suggest 
that these theories can be grouped into roughly three approaches. 
The first approach assumes rational users who decide whether or 
not to disclose based on a ‘privacy-calculus’ assessment 
comparing privacy risks and disclosure benefits. Most prominent 
in this respect is the APCO model (Antecedents →Privacy 
concerns → Outcomes), which assumes a relationship between 
users’ awareness of the privacy practices and self-disclosure [37]. 
The second approach also adopts the idea of a ‘privacy calculus’ 
but does not presume a fully rational user. Rather, it assumes that 
disclosure decisions are bounded by decision-making biases and 
cognitive limitations. According to this view, users make 
systematic errors when disclosing personal data and put their own 
privacy at risk unwillingly. The third approach assumes that users 
do not perform a privacy calculus and fail to account for privacy 
risks.  
Which of these approaches best reflects reality holds fundamental 
implications for what effective user-centric privacy protection 
design ought to look like. Depending on the approach, users are 
either deemed able to self-protect when provided with all relevant 
information in a user-friendly way or are deemed incapable of 
self-protection and need backend design solutions or regulators to 
protect them. Despite a wealth of research, the empirical evidence 
on which approach best reflects reality is not straightforward [25, 
37] and there are only few attempts to ensure a causal 
understanding of the phenomenon via experimental research [31, 
37]. Until recently, the majority of the community has followed 
the rational user approach and it has been an exception “for 
privacy researchers to consider alternative models and 
explanations outside the APCO model” [32, p. 640]. 
Policy makers’ also largely adopt the rational user approach [32]. 
For example, in the US, rational users are expected to help the 
market self-regulate by choosing more privacy-friendly providers 
[43]. The main role of the regulators, most notably the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), is then to educate the public about 
online privacy and to recommend to the internet providers good 
privacy practices (for example, make a clear privacy notice 
available) and to hold them accountable if they do not adhere to 
their own policies [8, 44, 45]. In the EU, the recent general data 
protection regulation (GDPR) likewise assumes that the key to 
data protection lies in user rights and information [22].  
Privacy policies are the dominant information instrument. To 
allow rational users make informed decisions, policies are 
expected to provide all necessary information to allow for a 
privacy calculus. Despite the general availability of privacy 
policies, ample evidence suggests that users are nonetheless 
uninformed and fail to self-protect [12, 13]. Note that to be 
rational users need not be informed. Even ignorance can be 
rational when the cost of getting the information outweighs the 
benefit of disclosure [16, 46]. Following this logic, the most 
discussed reason for uninformed disclosure is policies’ 
inadequacy as an information tool. In fact, privacy policies tend to 
be long, legalistic, and vague and are not usually written with the 
user in mind [14-17, 19, 29, 47]. Users also practically never read 
these hard to understand texts [15, 18, 30, 38, 48].  
In response and remaining with the notion of rational users, 
scholars and policy makers have called for policies to become 
better information tools, i.e. for them to become easily 
comprehensible and transparent [15, 18-23]. Specifically, 
according to the FTC the privacy policies “should be clear and 
conspicuous, posted in a prominent location, and readily 
accessible…and also unavoidable” [49, p.7-8], whereas according 
to the GDPR they should be presented ““in a manner which is 
clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible 
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language“ [22, 
p.35].   
The Effects of Transparent Privacy Policies on Policy 
Comprehension 
It is plausible to assume that the majority of users will read and 
comprehend transparent policies. An eye-tracking study in fact 
found that users carefully read a privacy policy when presented 
prominently but at best skimmed it when they had to click on a 
link in order to access it [30]. Nonetheless, the time people looked 
at the policy explained only 14 percent of the variance in the 
knowledge people held about the policy [30]. Consequently, 
reading a policy appears to be no guarantee for policy 
comprehension. Internet users have limited time and attention 
and may not fully comprehend privacy policies for many reasons 
[16, 25, 50]. By now users are also habituated to accepting terms 
and conditions without reading them [38, 51]. Even if policies are 
short and transparent, users may still not engage with and 
comprehend privacy policies.  
Furthermore, transparency is an ambiguous concept [40, 50], not 
least because it incorporates both prominence (ease of access), and 
simplicity and conciseness. While simplicity likely increases user 
comprehension, prominence might have the opposite effect [18, 
27, 37]. Some research suggests that a policy’s prominence may 
assure users that there is nothing to hide, so they may skip reading 
the privacy policies [25, 40]. Even if users read policies, their 
apparent transparency may affect comprehension. Ample 
evidence suggests that people see what they expect to see [24]. 
Consequently, users can “project their privacy expectations onto 
the privacy notice” [14, p.219]. This may go in two directions. If 
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users interpret transparency as a signal that there is nothing to 
hide and nothing to worry about, they may miss, misperceive or 
miscomprehend threats to their privacy even after a cursory 
reading of privacy policies. In contrast, if users interpret 
prominent privacy policies as a privacy warning, they may 
become more concerned [52] and more likely to identify potential 
threats. Thus, transparency could foster as well as hinder 
comprehension and informed consent and we assume that some 
level of miscomprehension will persist even if policies are very 
simple and transparent. This assumption is a necessary 
consideration when next hypothesizing how transparency will 
affect disclosure. 
The Effects of Transparency and Privacy Friendliness 
on Self-Disclosure 
No study to date varied privacy friendliness in the context of 
prominent policies of SNSs. Related evidence, however, supports 
policy makers’ assumption that information transparency affects 
users’ willingness to disclose PD. Research has found that 
prominent symbols and signals of privacy (e.g. TRUSTe certificate 
or the privacy bird indicator) increase privacy-protective 
behaviors [18, 53, 54]. For example, LaRose and Rifon [34] showed 
that the presence of a prominent privacy-invasion “warning” 
decreased respondents intention to disclose PD.  
Closer to the matter of manipulating the policy itself, there is 
additional evidence from the context of ecommerce. Some of this 
research varied the transparency of privacy policies, other 
research varied their privacy-friendliness. By and large this 
evidence appears to suggest that users will react to prominent 
policies in accordance with the privacy-friendliness of their 
content. For example, Andrade, Kaltcheva, and Weitz [33, 351] 
showed that the presence of a prominent short and fully privacy-
friendly policy decreased concern for self-disclosure in 
comparison to a vague notice which stated that the web-site 
policy is to “respect and protect the privacy” of the users. 
Likewise, Liu, Marchewka [35] showed that the obvious presence 
of a privacy-friendly policy increased re-purchase intention (as a 
proxy for intention to disclose) and, in a survey study, Wirtz, Lwin 
[55] have shown that perceived friendliness of policies decrease 
users’ intention to upload fabricated or incomplete personal data.  
In sum, these insights suggest that users will adjust their 
disclosure behavior in accordance with the privacy-friendliness of 
a policy. Other studies, however, suggest that this may hold only 
for users who pay attention to the policy and correctly 
comprehend it. For example, in a very well simulated ecommerce 
study by Metzger [36], users disclosed the same amount of PD 
regardless of whether the policy was very transparent and 
privacy-friendly, vague and friendly, or entirely lacking. Notably, 
in the same study about a third of participants reportedly failed to 
notice the policies when they were present. Similar results are 
reported by Jensen, Potts [18] who asked participants to compare 
pairs of e-retailers webpages. In their study only every forth 
participant actually checked (clicked on) the policies and only 
then privacy-friendly policies had a bigger effect on the choice of 
an e-retailer in comparison to privacy-invasive polices. Finally, in 
a university SNS context, Adjerid, Acquisti [26] showed that 
privacy notices that warn about higher privacy-risks (faculty staff 
will be able to view the answers) made students disclose less on 
sensitive questions (e.g. who was your least favorite professor?) 
than notices with lower privacy-risks (only students will be able 
to view the answers). However, these effects were present only 
when students were undistracted between the presentation of the 
policy, constraining the effect of the policy notice to ideal 
circumstances.  
Remember that we expect that transparency will not equate to full 
user comprehension. Although we expect that prominent policies 
will affect users in accordance with their privacy-friendliness, we 
do not expect this to hold for users who miscomprehend the 
policy. Specifically, we expect that comprehension moderates the 
relationship between privacy-friendliness of a policy and self-
disclosure: only those who correctly comprehend the policy can 
adequately react to its content: 
H1: Policy comprehension moderates the relationship 
between transparent privacy policies and user self-
disclosure, thus, users who comprehend privacy-friendly 
policies will self-disclosure on SNSs more than users who 
comprehend privacy-invasive policies whereas users who do 
not comprehend the policy will exhibit similar self-disclosure 
across different policies. 
The Effects of Specific Privacy Threats on Personal 
Data Disclosure 
Thus far, we have considered privacy friendliness as a 
unidimensional, dichotomous construct, with a policy being either 
privacy-friendly or privacy-unfriendly. Though this is in keeping 
with the common practice in the literature, privacy policies 
contain several elements that can be more or less privacy-friendly. 
So far, there is little evidence on how consumers react to different 
types of threats within a policy. A majority of studies have used 
scales that combine general privacy concerns (e.g., “How 
concerned are you about your personal privacy on this website”) 
and specific ones (e.g., “How concerned are you about this website 
sharing your personal information with other parties?” or “Are 
you concerned that an email you send may be read by someone 
else besides the person you sent it to?”) [36, 56-58]. Yet, not all of 
the threats addressed in a policy are deemed relevant by users [28, 
29, 59, 60]. For example, users were shown to look significantly 
longer on the sections “information we collect”, “how we use your 
personal information” and “sharing and disclosure of personal 
information” than on other sections [30]. In other words, specific 
privacy threats, rather than a policy’s overall level of privacy-
friendliness, are likely to drive users’ disclosure decisions once 
they become apparent. 
To further advance the current knowledge base, we test for this 
possibility and focus on two of the most prevalent and dangerous 
privacy threats in the context of SNSs: secondary data use and 
public data visibility. Secondary data use refers to a company 
requesting the right to use user data beyond the primary purpose 
of data collection. Most of the privacy discussions in politics focus 
on secondary data use because it holds substantial potential for 
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commercialization and is considered one of the most important 
causes for concern. A second threat causing concern due to its 
exploitability is the visibility of PD by an unknown audience. This 
threat is particularly prevalent in the context of SNS [28, 61, 62]. 
Users have reason to be concerned about both of these threats. 
Yet, we propose that they will not react to them equally strongly. 
Specifically, we propose that users react more strongly to the 
more easily comprehensible threat of data visibility than to 
secondary data use. The reason we assume stronger reactions to 
visibility is twofold. First, visibility is a dominant theme in the 
privacy discourse specific to SNS. SNS providers themselves foster 
a focus on visibility when they talk about privacy. For example, 
under the privacy settings on Facebook the three options are 
“Who can see my stuff?”, “Who can contact me?”, and “Who can 
look me up?”. All of these are visibility concerns. Likewise, seven 
out of eight options in the privacy settings on Twitter are visibility 
related. SNS users thus have control over the visibility of their 
data [25, 38, 47] but are rarely invited or able to control secondary 
data use. Second, an argument has been made that users need to 
see or at least metaphorically grasp their data to comprehend and 
protect them [63]. The threat of data visibility is easy to 
comprehend. People know what it means to know more about 
another person. They have much less understanding when it 
comes to the possibilities of secondary data use and the threats 
this may entail [12, 13].  
Some prior evidence supports the proposition that users are more 
sensitive with regard to visibility than secondary use. For 
example, Stutzman, Gross [64] analyzed the public Facebook 
disclosures of more than 5000 students from 2005 to 2011 and 
showed that over time, the students decreased the amount of PD 
they shared with the public, but not the PD they shared with 
Facebook, i.e. they moved the place of disclosure from public walls 
to private messages which would still fall under secondary use 
agreements. Similarly, Bazarova and Choi [65] showed that self-
disclosure on SNSs varies depending on whether it will be visible 
to restricted or public audiences, and Das and Kramer [66, p.120] 
concluded that self-censoring by Facebook users was a function of 
the “perceived audiences”.  
Thus, we anticipate that SNS users will be more likely to attend 
and react to threats of visibility than to threats of secondary data 
use. This entails two predictions concerning comprehension and 
disclosure. First and building on the discussed likelihood of 
miscomprehension despite transparency, we assume a systematic 
bias in the comprehension of privacy policies:  
H2: Transparent privacy policies with secondary data use 
threats will be miscomprehended more often than 
transparent policies with visibility threats.  
Second, and going beyond the proposed effect on comprehension, 
we expect an effect of the type of threat on disclosure behavior. 
We assume that privacy policies highlighting visibility risks will 
affect user disclosure more than privacy policies highlighting 
secondary data use. Taking into account that comprehension is a 
necessary precondition for users to react to any threat we 
hypothesize: 
H3:  Among users who comprehend the policy, privacy 
policies with visibility threats to privacy have stronger effects 
on self-disclosure than transparent policies with secondary 
use threats to privacy. 
We make no prediction for users miscomprehending the policy 
because miscomprehension can go into multiple directions.  
A Note on Self-disclosure 
Data disclosure can be conceptualized and assessed in multiple 
ways. To maximize ecological validity, we employ a multitude of 
disclosure measures. Most previous research has assessed 
intention to disclose rather than actual disclosure [41, 42]. Even 
though behavioral intentions predict actual behavior [67], when 
it comes to privacy, intentions and behaviors are often at odds – 
a phenomenon known as the privacy paradox [18, 41, 42, 68, 69]. 
Thus, we complement measures of disclosure intention with 
actual behavioral proxies. With regard to these proxies, we 
discriminate between quantity and quality of PD disclosure. Next 
to quantity, i.e., how much personal information is being 
disclosed, users can also regulate the quality, authenticity or 
richness of their disclosures [66, 70]. For example, posting a status 
on Facebook implies that users have decided to disclose. In 
addition, users can decide how valuable this disclosure is, that is, 
how extensive, personally relevant, and self-revealing – in other 
words how qualitatively rich these data is. We test our hypotheses 
with regard to all of these conceptualizations of disclosure. 
METHOD 
To allow for causal conclusions, we designed an experiment in 
which we simulated a fictitious SNS (called Coffee Shop) and 
manipulated the privacy-friendliness of its very transparent 
privacy policy.  
Stimulus Material 
Following FTC and GDPR guidelines on transparency, we focused 
on the main threats of visibility and secondary data use and 
designed the Coffee Shop’s privacy policy in a simple tabular and 
additional textual format. This has been argued to best 
communicate privacy settings [71]. Figure 1 depicts one of these 
transparent policies. It informs users about who owns, who can 
see (visibility information) and who can use/sell their data 
(secondary data use) on Coffee Shop.  
We pre-tested the transparency of the policy (n= 60) and 
confirmed that this policy format was perceived as transparent in 
terms of simplicity, clarity and easiness of comprehension. On an 
11 point semantic differential scale with bipolar adjective pairs 
(e.g. easy to understand – hard to understand, ranging from -5 to 
+5) participants rated the language used as very clear (mean=3.47, 
sd=2.06) and plain (mean=3.27, sd=2.04), and confirmed that it was 
easy to understand (mean= 2.59, sd=2.64).  
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Figure 1. Example of the privacy policy on Coffee Shop 
Design, Procedure and Measures 
We invited respondents to participate in our study by asking them 
to “help us learn what makes a good social network”. In an initial 
screening section that goes beyond this study (see Figure 2 for the 
study flow), we queried respondents about their attitudes and 
behavior on Facebook as well as their basic demographic data. 
Next, all respondents landed on an information page with the 
cover design of several news headers. The main headline read 
“Coffee Shop trumps Facebook. New social network reaches 2 
billion users.” We asked respondents to imagine that the SNS 
“Coffee Shop” had emerged on the market, was already overtaking 
Facebook in popularity and most of their friends had already 
joined it. We included this information to preclude Facebook’s 
network effect, a known obstacle to user mobility across SNSs. 
Additionally, participants learned that this new social network 
has “a very clear, simple, and TRANSPARENT PRIVACY POLICY” 
(Figure A, Appendix, see the bottom figure for the stimulus used 
in the control group). We explicitly positioned Coffee Shop as 
competing against Facebook on the argument of more 
transparency about privacy, because this is a known concern on 
Facebook.  
Respondents clicked next to see what Coffee Shop looked like. 
They landed on a mock up webpage designed to look like a 
welcome page and actual privacy policy of Coffee Shop. This 
ensured prominence of the privacy policy and simulated a 
situation where policies would potentially be unavoidable, 
following FTC and GDPR guidelines on transparency.  
We randomly assigned respondents to one of five conditions 
consisting of a control group and four different privacy policies. 
These policies resulted from our 2×2 between-subject design 
which we employed to test for effects of variations in privacy 
friendliness. (visibility: entire community can see vs not see the 
data × secondary data use: SNS can use/sell vs. not use/sell the 
data) All other aspects of the privacy policy were kept constant 
across conditions (see Figure 2).  
Rather than being presented with a privacy policy participants in 
the control group were asked to join Coffee Shop without any 
reference to transparency and also saw no privacy policy. This 
group, thus, serves as a realistic benchmark control for what 
happens when privacy policies are hidden and users do not look 
them up.  
 
Figure 2.Study Flow
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Comprehension via detailed confirmation of policy 
Immediately after presenting the privacy policy page to all 
experimental groups, we subtly checked whether participants had 
understood the respective policy. In keeping with the cover story, 
that is, a new platform that authentically values transparency, the 
social network asked their potential new users to demonstrate 
that they had read and understood the privacy policy (“It really 
matters to us that before you sign in you really understand your 
rights at our shop…”). Users saw the same table from the previous 
page and were asked to fill in (by ticking the boxes) who can see 
and use/sell their data on Coffee Shop. Importantly, if unsure, 
participants had the opportunity to go back and see the actual 
policy again before replicating the actual ticks, though they could 
continue even if they got the policy wrong. The correspondence 
between the ticks made and the actual privacy policy viewed 
served as a measure of participant comprehension. Not having 
been exposed to a privacy policy, the control group faced no such 
comprehension check. 
Disclosure in a simulated 3-step registration process 
Next respondents indicated how likely it was that they would 
actually open an account on Coffee Shop on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1=“certainly not” to 5=“certainly yes”. This served 
as a measure of disclosure intent. All participants who indicated 
that they had no intention to join at all were thanked and not 
guided through Coffee Shop any further. 
All respondents who indicated that they would be at least 
somewhat interested to join Coffee Shop next landed on a three-
step registration process for the network. The page required their 
(nick)name and to write in the “about me” section in step one, to 
upload a profile picture in step two, and to write a first status in 
step three. In all of these steps the participants could choose not 
to disclose any of their personal data To simulate the potential 
transfer from Facebook and to comply with the data portability 
principle in the GDPR, respondents could also click to indicate 
that they would import their name and profile picture from 
Facebook.  
To assess the quantity of self-disclosure we summed up disclosure 
decisions across the three steps. We coded every disclosed item 
(name, about me, photo, and status) with one when provided and 
zero when not provided. The resulting disclosure index could take 
on values between zero and four. 
In addition, we assessed a proxy for the richness of the self-
disclosures by coding the content of the status posts, which was 
the only disclosure item that could vary in richness. We coded the 
status messages with zero if they respondents did not write a 
status, with one if they wrote only “Hi”, “Hello” or similar, and 
with two if they wrote more personal statuses (e.g., “I’m up for 
something new, interesting, and exciting :-)”) thus making richer 
disclosures.  
After the registration process, respondents were redirected back 
to the survey where we asked them how realistic they found the 
SNS transfer scenario to be; from 1=“very unrealistic” to 5=“very 
realistic”. In order to identify respondents who were not paying 
attention to the survey, we incorporated two attention-testing 
questions, one before and one after the experimental 
manipulation. We placed the questions in-between scales so that 
they would be missed by people who simply clicked through 
without paying attention (e.g., “please click ‘rarely’ if you are still 
paying attention”). Participants failing to pass these checks were 
screened out.  
Sample 
A professional market research company administered the study 
to their internal online panel of over 30.000 respondents. This 
panel is a nationally representative sample of Internet users in 
Austria. The respondents were randomly drawn from this sample 
to ensure representativeness. All invited panel users were first 
asked whether they hold a Facebook account and could thus 
believably simulate a transfer to a new account. If they did not, 
they were screened out automatically. The final sample consisted 
of 214 Facebook users (55 percent female, mean age=40 years; 
sd=4.5 years) who completed all questions and passed the 
attention checks. 
RESULTS 
Groups were structurally equivalent in terms of their 
demographic makeup. Namely, all groups were of similar age (f(4, 
208)=0.52, n.s.), gender (f(4, 207)=0.32, n.s.) and had similar levels 
of education (χ2(1)=0.72, n.s). Also, all experimental groups found 
the scenario to be equally realistic (m=3.09, se=1.23, f(3, 209)=1.28, 
n.s,). Presumable due to the lack of a clear unique selling point of 
Coffee Shop over Facebook (i.e. transparency), the control group 
found the transfer scenario to be less realistic than the 
experimental groups  (m = 2.50, se = 1.26, t(176)=2.51, p<.05) .  
Comprehension of Transparent Privacy Policies 
The primary assumption behind the proposition of privacy 
policies is that they users will attend to them, comprehend them 
and eventually provide informed consent. As outlined above, we 
anticipate that this may be too optimistic a view. We thus first 
looked at the effect of transparent policies on policy 
comprehension. To do so we checked whether respondents 
correctly replicated the rights and threats that the privacy policy 
comprised, by ticking the exact same boxes.  
Comparing the simple and unavoidable policies participants had 
seen to those they recalled only seconds later yielded a picture of 
considerable miscomprehension. Overall, only 53 percent of the 
respondents were able to correctly recall all the respective policy’s 
content, with a 95 percent confidence interval between 46 and 61 
percent  
In a next step we looked to test H2 and see whether secondary use 
threats were more likely to be miscomprehended than visibility 
threats. To do that, we ran a logistic regression with policy 
comprehension as the outcome variable and the specific policy 
elements (secondary data use threat, visibility threats) as predictor 
variables. Results show that those participants who were exposed 
to the threat of secondary data use were more than twice as likely 
to miscomprehend this information in comparison to those 
participants who were not exposed to this threat (β=0.81, se=.32, 
or =2.25, p<.05). Exposure to the visibility threat was not 
associated with the likelihood of miscomprehension (β=-0.48, 
se=.32, OR=.62, n.s). 
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Table 1. Privacy Notice Comprehension: What Respondents Saw and What They Recalled 
 Respondent  
recalled:  
Respondent  
recalled: 
Company will 
not sell PD 
Company will 
use/sell PD 
The ublic will 
not see PD 
The public 
will see the PD 
Privacy  
notice  
showed: 
Company will not 
use/sell PD 93% 7%
a Public will not 
see PD  72% 28%
c 
Company will  
use/sell PD 35%
b 65% The public will 
see the PD 24%
d 76% 
 N 90 85  97 78 
Note. In bold are respondents who did not comprehend the privacy notice: a. overestimated secondary threats, b. underestimated 
secondary threats, c. overestimated visibility threats, d. underestimated visibility threats 
 
In a next step we looked to test H2 and see whether secondary use 
threats were more likely to be miscomprehended than visibility 
threats. To do that, we ran a logistic regression with policy 
comprehension as the outcome variable and the specific policy 
elements (secondary data use threat, visibility threats) as predictor 
variables. Results show that those participants who were exposed 
to the threat of secondary data use were more than twice as likely 
to miscomprehend this information in comparison to those 
participants who were not exposed to this threat (β=0.81, se=.32, 
or =2.25, p<.05). Exposure to the visibility threat was not 
associated with the likelihood of miscomprehension (β=-0.48, 
se=.32, OR=.62, n.s). 
As predicted in H2 information on secondary data use was 
associated with policy miscomprehension versus visibility threats 
were not. Notably, participants were more likely to 
miscomprehend the policy in an unsafe direction, i.e. 
miscomprehension was associated with a wrong sense of security 
(Table 1). Participants’ most frequent error was to think that the 
SNS had no rights to share and sell their data (i.e., secondary data 
use) when in fact it had. One in four participants also erred with 
regard to who can see their data, but this went both in the safe as 
well as in the unsafe direction.  
Transparent Privacy Policies and Self-
disclosure 
The next question we addressed was whether a transparent 
policy’s privacy friendliness would affect disclosure specifically 
among those who comprehended it (H1) and whether this effect 
would depend on the type of threat present (H3). For this purpose, 
we established a new variable which divided respondents into 
those who correctly recalled the policy and those who did not. We 
used this variable and the manipulation of threat of visibility and 
threat of secondary data use to predict disclosure. We ran 
ANOVAs on the willingness to join the SNS and the number of 
uploaded items and conducted ordinal regression and Chi² tests 
for the richness of disclosed PD. 
Willingness to join the SNS. A three-way ANOVA on users’ 
willingness to join the new SNS revealed a significant main effect 
of the presence of a visibility threat (f(1, 167)=3.98, p<.05); a 
significant main effect of policy comprehension (f(1, 167)=14.82, 
p<.001); and a significant three-way interaction between visibility 
threat, secondary data use threat, and policy comprehension (f(1, 
167)=4.42, p<.05). As evidenced by the respective main effect, the 
willingness to join was higher among those who comprehended 
the policy and by those who did not face a visibility threat. To 
facilitate the interpretation of the three-way interaction, Figure 3 
shows the pattern of results among those who (a) did not and (b) 
those who did comprehend the privacy policy. According to H1 
we expect that the policy content will only affect those who 
comprehend it. According to H3 we expect that this holds in 
particular for the visibility threat.  
In line with these predictions, we find no difference in willingness 
to join among those who did not comprehend the policy 
(f(2,83)=.11, n.s). Among those who did comprehend the policy we 
find the expected effect of visibility threats (f(1,92)=6.95, p<.01). If 
visibility threats were correctly reported as present, participants 
were less likely to join. The presence of secondary data use threats 
also affected joining intentions, but to lesser extent (f(1,92)=2.88, 
p<.05).  
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Figure 3. Willingness to join the SNS based on policy comprehension and  type of privacy threat
Number of uploaded PD on the SNS. A three-way ANOVA on the 
number of uploaded items showed only a significant two-way 
interaction between visibility threats and policy comprehension (f 
(1, 136) = 4.19, p < .05) which is illustrated in Figure 4. In line with 
H1 the policies content only affected the number of PD 
respondents decided to disclose if participants comprehended this 
content. In line with H3, only one content, visibility threats, did 
yield this effect. Respondents disclosed less, if others could see 
their disclosed content. Although the pattern emerging resembles 
that for visibility threats, the threat of secondary data use did not 
significantly affect disclosure 
 
Figure 4 Number of uploaded PD depending on policy comprehension and privacy threat
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Richness (quality) of disclosed information. To test how 
comprehension affects the relationship between transparent 
policy and richness of the self-disclosure, we ran two ordinal 
regressions, one for those who miscomprehended and one for 
those who comprehended the policies. 
The results showed that among those who miscomprehended the 
policy, neither threat had influence on the richness of the 
disclosed status. However among those who comprehended the 
policy, we found significant difference similar to the results for 
quantity of disclosure.  
Table 2. Status Richness (Quality) Depending on the Threats Present in the Notice and on Notice Comprehension 
Status 
richness 
(quality
) 
Users who comprehended a privacy notice that stated: 
Control group Company can sell 
(Secondary data use threat) 
Community can see 
(visibility threat) 
No Yes No Yes 
Did not 
write a 
status 
30% 44% 24% 49% 32% 
Wrote 
just Hi or 
Hello 
26% 24% 27% 23% 29% 
Wrote a 
more 
personal 
status  
45% 31% 49%* 28%* 38% 
N 47 45 45 47 34 
Note: * χ2(1) = 4.39, p < 0.05; Percentages are subject to a rounding error 
Namely, respondents who saw and comprehended a SNS privacy 
policy that entailed a visibility threat wrote less personal statuses 
than respondents who correctly comprehended that their data 
would not be visible (χ2(1) = 4.39, p < 0.05). In contrast, the 
notification that the SNS will use their data commercially did not 
significantly affect richness of disclosure, although the direction 
was in the expected direction (see Table 2).This final result also 
supports the anticipated effect of comprehension and type of 
threat hypothesized in H1 and H3. 
 
DISCUSSION  
Informed consent is the pinnacle of user self-protection and policy 
makers and scholar have called for SNS platforms to provide users 
with simple and transparent privacy policies. But will the change 
of privacy policy design yield informed consent? To answer this 
question, scholars have called for more experimental studies 
conducted with representative samples and actual disclosure 
measures [31, 32, 41]. By conducting an experimental simulation 
of the process of joining a new SNS, we have answered to these 
calls. We find that transparent privacy policies are insufficient to 
ensure informed consent. Despite placing the policy prominently 
and even unavoidably, despite focusing on threats we know users 
care about, despite using a policy design with proven simplicity 
and despite forcing participants to engage with the policy by 
asking them to replicate it, half of our representative population 
sample of Facebook users did not correctly comprehend the 
policy. This is even more remarkable if we consider that the 
sample consisted only of participants who had passed two 
attention checks and that respondents could go back and double 
check the policy. Our sample of SNS users was thus unable to 
provide informed consent and- to a large extent- did not disclose 
data as a function of the risks the policy entails. This puts into 
question whether truly informed consent is at all attainable and is 
in direct contrast with the rational user hypothesis [72].  
Of particular concern is that miscomprehension was 
systematically in favor of the SNS rather than the user. The most 
frequent recall error was that respondents thought that the 
company will not allow secondary data use, even though it 
transparently announced that it will. It could be that  common 
practices by popular SNS providers which draw attention to 
visibility rather than secondary data use have habituated users in 
disregarding these threats [25, 51, 73]. A potential other 
explanation is that transparency signals trust and thus leads users 
to misperceive the content of the policy in privacy-unsafe 
directions [14]. More research is needed to unravel the full reasons 
behind users’ miscomprehension and its effect on self-disclosure.  
Another key finding is that users do react to visibility threats once 
these are salient. Users who were aware that their data will not be 
publicly accessible disclosed more and richer PD, suggesting that 
salient visibility threats lead users to self-censor their disclosures. 
The secondary data use threats play no such role and do not affect 
disclosure. This is noteworthy because secondary data use may be 
an even bigger actual threat. The right to secondary data use may 
pertain to all data that users provide. This entails log in data etc. 
which users may not even be conscious of. As users learn that 
visibility threats can lead to secondary data use threats (as was the 
case with the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal) and as 
they gain more right to control over secondary data use through 
the GDPR, it will be interesting to see if the influence of the two 
threats on self-disclosure changes. 
Design and Policy Implications 
The study at hand shows that we cannot expect that transparent 
privacy policies are a stand-alone solution for gaining users’ 
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informed consent. This is why efforts to make privacy policies 
machine-readable, either by natural language processing efforts 
[74] or with the help of privacy protocols [75], are one necessary 
addition. Stricter regulations and potentially also user education 
are other options that can mitigate this problem [55, 71]. 
However, given that the information was already presented in a 
very simple and prominent manner it is doubtful whether user 
education may really solve the issue. Users appear to have become 
accustomed to all or nothing offers in exchange for (among other 
things) privacy-invasion [38]. Thus, designing comprehension 
checks in the privacy policies (such as proof of direct user 
engagement in a captcha-like proof of comprehension and not just 
tick of a box) seems essential.  
Our results also hold implications for what type of threats may be 
in particular need of designers and policy makers’ attention. Users 
seem to care more about visibility than secondary data use even 
though secondary data use can potentially be more harmful to 
them [76]. Our results show that users (a) systematically 
underestimate the risk of secondary data use when engaging with 
a privacy notice and that (b) even if they recognize this risk they 
still behaviorally disregard it. Therefore, our results primarily 
suggest the need for designers to highlight the secondary data use 
threats. In addition, enhanced user control over secondary data 
use might help mitigate the current failure of self-protection. 
Though most SNSs have public access as their default setting, 
almost all of them allow users to restrict access and visibility to 
their personal data [47] but do not allow similar controls when it 
comes to secondary data use. If those solutions are not embedded 
in the design, policy makers will need to protect the users with 
regard to the right of use to their data where their own 
consciousness of consequences appears limited. 
In sum, if we are to have informed SNS users, we need more than 
just simple and transparent privacy notices. At this stage of 
progression into the digital age a lot of users will not read or 
comprehend them, and even when they do, they will not punish 
privacy-invasive services, and at best reward privacy-friendly 
services with more disclosure. Also they will systematically 
underestimate the risk of secondary data use. We may have to 
drop the rational user hypothesis and remove the burden of 
protecting their privacy against hard to understand, powerful 
players from the shoulder of users altogether. 
Limitations and Future Research 
We are aware that our study has limitations that should be 
addressed in future research. Our sample was representative only 
of Internet users in a European country. Given that privacy norms 
and expectations have been found to be culturally dependent [77], 
it would also be interesting to establish the extent to which the 
results generalize to other cultural contexts in which consumers 
may be more or less  privacy aware.  
Furthermore, social network users have been shown to have 
higher risk taking attitudes [78], and it is thus possible that users’ 
propensity to disclose in the face of transparent privacy-
invasiveness is particularly pronounced in the context of  SNSs 
and cannot be generalized further. Future research will be needed 
to look into the extent to which our insights generalize to other 
contexts featuring privacy policies such as ecommerce, 
entertainment, and information applications. It appears possible 
that in these contexts where visibility threats play less of a role, 
users are more sensitive to the threats of secondary data use.  
It would also be interesting to extend the inquiry to additional 
privacy threats. We specifically considered two privacy threats 
that are known to matter in the context of SNS [28, 29, 59, 60] and 
thus the privacy policy was oversimplified. It will take a lot of 
effort by the community and the regulators to overcome the trade-
off between simple and short and also comprehensive privacy 
policies that also include other relevant information like all the 
type of PD, type of processing, storage, security, revoke of consent 
etc.  
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